Abstract Spatial wage theory suggests that employers in different regions may offer different pay rates to reflect local amenities and cost of living. Higher wages may be required to compensate for a less pleasant environment or a higher cost of living. If wages in a competing sector within an area are less flexible and therefore less competitive this may lead to an inability to employ staff. This paper considers the market for nursing staff in France where there is general regulation of wages and public hospitals compete for staff with the private hospital and non-hospital sectors. We consider two types of nursing staff, registered and assistant nurses and first establish the degree of spatial variation in the competitiveness of pay of nurses in public hospitals. We then consider whether these spatial variations are associated with variation in the employment of nursing staff. We find that despite regulation of pay in the public and private sector, there are substantial local variations in the competitiveness of nurses' pay. We find evidence that the spatial variations in the competitiveness of pay are associated with relative numbers of assistant nurses but not registered nurses. While we find the influence of the competitiveness of pay is small, it suggests that nonpay conditions may be an important factor in adjusting the labour market as might be expected in such a regulated market.
Introduction
Nurses' unions have complained that there are not enough nurses in French hospitals [1] . According to Baret [2] there is no measure of nursing shortage in France. This nurse shortage is neither new nor confined to France [3] [4] [5] . Most studies have investigated the responsiveness of nurse supply to wages. They show that there is a limited response of nurse supply to wages [6] [7] [8] . Few studies have investigated the role of wage differentials across sectors on variations of nurse supply [9, 10] . In France, the National Observatory on the demography of health professions [11] reports widespread regional variations in the shortage of nurses in education, suggesting that local conditions play a part in accounting for them. 1 Thus, while in 2004 1 % of nurse training places went unfilled in Aquitaine, 22 % went unfilled in Île de France. While there is much discussion in France about a national shortage of nurses there is none Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10198-014-0628-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. about local variations in nurse shortages and there has been no empirical investigation of this issue. Local variations in nurse shortages would be expected to arise if there are local variations in the competitiveness of nurses' pay where local variations in competitiveness may result from centralised wage regulation. An area where the nurse wage is uncompetitive would be expected to find it harder to attract nurses and thus suffer a shortage.
This article investigates the role of competitiveness of pay in the employment of nurses in French public hospitals. The analysis considers two nursing types, registered and assistant nurses operating within the public sector and compares them with nurses in the private not-for-profit sector, nurses within the private for-profit sector and the non-hospital private sector. The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to establish the degree of spatial variation in the competitiveness of pay of nurses in public hospitals in France. The second is to explore whether the spatial variations in the competitiveness of nursing pay are associated with variations in the employment of nursing staff using three alternative nursing employment measures; nurse-to-bed, nurse-to-episode and nurse-staff ratios. The paper is in eight Sections. ''The theory of compensating wage differentials'', ''Previous research on the role of pay on public service delivery'' and ''Pay regulation in France'' present the literature which this analysis relates to. ''French hospital system'' describes the French hospital system. ''Standardised spatial wage differentials'' outlines the measure that we utilise for capturing the spatial variations in the competitiveness of pay. ''Models and hypotheses'' outlines the models and hypotheses we will test, with ''Data'' describing the data which is used in the analysis. ''Spatial variations in the degree of competitiveness of nursing pay'' presents the analysis evidencing the degree of spatial variation in the competitiveness of public sector nurses' pay and then relates this spatial variation to nurse employment outcomes. Finally, the last two Sections discuss and conclude.
We first present the previous literature for this research in the following subsections.
The theory of compensating wage differentials
The theory of compensating wage differentials suggests that in a competitive labour market the wage will reflect the total advantages and disadvantages of a job. Observed spatial variations in wages will reflect underlying differences in the cost of living or levels of amenities in different geographical areas. Thus, this theory provides the theoretical framework underpinning this analysis. It explains why the 'underlying' structure of pay differs between geographical areas where labour markets are unregulated [12, 13] . Higher pay in some areas of the country is expected where the cost of living is higher, while higher pay is also necessary to compensate for a less pleasant working environment. This can be empirically investigated by the computation of standardised spatial wage differentials (SSWDs) where earnings are standardised for differences in the human capital of the workforce and other differences in the industrial and workforce composition of the areas. Any remaining variation captured by area effects will capture the underlying differences in the cost of living and amenities between these areas. Empirical research on the topic is not clear cut. Researchers have found that wage differentials, on average, reflect job and individual characteristics [14] [15] [16] but that regional wage differentials only partially reflect differences in amenities and cost of living [17] [18] [19] [20] . But where the wage does not fully compensate for such geographical differences in the cost of living and amenities, this makes those areas in which this happens less attractive and we might therefore expect to observe difficulties attracting and retaining staff in these areas.
Previous research on the role of pay on public service delivery
While it is assumed that wages in the competitive private sector will tend to adjust to reflect any differences in compensation required to attract workers to particular areas, this degree of pay flexibility is less likely to be found within the public sector. In England, centralised regulation of nurses' pay means that pay is the same across many different local labour markets. In contrast, pay in the private sector in England reveals substantial spatial variation because collective bargaining, which was the major mechanism by which pay was regulated historically in the private sector in England, now plays a minor role [21] . These differences in pay setting result in spatial differences in the competitiveness of nurses' pay which can be measured by the 'gaps' between nurses' pay and that of their comparators. These gaps have been found to be associated with variations in nursing shortages, as measured by nursing vacancy rates in hospitals in England: the less competitive the nurses' pay, the higher the vacancy rate [9] . However, this research only includes the non-hospital private sector as the nurses' comparator with no private hospital sector comparator group. Complementary research from Propper and Van Reenen [22] revealed that spatial variations in private sector pay, in outside wages, were associated with inferior hospital outcomes measured as death rates due to acute myocardial infarction.
The role of the competitiveness of pay of other hospital workers has been investigated by Elliott et al. [23] . For doctors there is no significant association between pay gaps and measures of shortage, though this association was revealed to be significant in some specifications for allied health professionals. However, it should be noted that the estimated SSWDs for doctors and allied heath professionals that are used to compute the pay gap are argued by the authors to be computed with less accuracy than those for nurses. The data on wages comes from the NHS pay roll which does not allow controls for the age and sex composition of the medical and allied health professional workforce, unlike the authors' previous work on nurses. Using the same method but applied to a very different sector, Ma et al. [24] found an impact of the geographical competitiveness of teachers' pay on measures of shortages of teachers in English schools.
There has therefore been little research into the role of the competitiveness of pay on public service delivery, with even less research into the role of the competitiveness of private sector pay on private sector performance. To our knowledge there is only one report commissioned by CentreForum which looked at this issue [25] which is mainly descriptive and reviews the role of central bargaining on the public sector and the private sector.
Pay regulation in France
In France pay is set and regulated centrally through collective bargaining, with 95 % of employees covered by collective bargaining arrangements in 2000 [26] . The impact of collective bargaining on the pay structure has been widely studied. The research reveals that where pay is regulated through collective bargaining, pay is less likely to vary locally [13, 18, [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . Reviewing the link between unions and wage dispersion, Hayter and Weinberg [27] argue that there is an extended body of literature that confirms that unions tend to compress the wage structure.
The coverage of collective bargaining is extensive in France, but pay variation between French regions and localities may still occur [31] . Collective bargaining is conducted at several different levels in France. In the private sector, branch (industry) agreements are negotiated nationally and have to be implemented by all firms within a branch [31] . However, firm agreements can supplement the increases specified in the branch agreement and may be a source of greater local pay variation.
Grade drift exists in both sectors and is another potential source of local pay variation. Drift may occur in both the public and private sectors though there is no research reporting whether it is more common in one sector than the other. However, Meurs and Edon [31] found, using the French Labour Force Survey of 2002, that in the private sector (including private for-profit hospitals) pay dispersion was greater than in the public sector (all public sectors, excluding publicly owned companies) and that the degree of variation (when controlling for individual and firm characteristics) differed across the country.
In the public sector local agreements are not possible. If there is no agreement between unions and the employer (the government), the government will award across-theboard pay increases unilaterally, and there has not been any agreement since 1998 [31] .
It appears that centralised wage regulation through collective bargaining in France might still result in spatial variations in pay, and that spatial variations in the competitiveness of nurses' pay, the gap between the pay of nurses in the public and private sectors, may exist. However, because wages are much more regulated in France than the UK, it might be reasoned that the resulting wage gaps may not be of sufficient magnitude to give rise to substantial geographical variations in the labour supply of nurses. Non-pay conditions may play a larger role in France than in a country where pay is less regulated.
French hospital system
Hospitals in France are divided into three different legal types: public hospitals, private not-for-profit hospitals and private for-profit hospitals. Public hospitals 2 can be large regional hospitals undertaking education and research and providing acute care and advanced treatments, or they may be local hospitals which run a smaller acute or maternity ward. Local hospitals depend on large regional hospitals for most of the more advanced care. They also rely on medical doctors in ambulatory care to provide some of their services. All public hospitals run an emergency service. Public hospitals represent 36 % of the total number of hospitals but represent 65 % of beds for complete care.
Not-for-profit hospitals are associations, mutual establishments or foundations, in which any surplus over costs is reinvested into the services provided for patients. For-profit hospitals have commercial status and aim to make a profit. Usually of smaller size, no private hospital will be as large as regional public hospitals. Private for-profit hospitals tend to specialise in routine procedures. Some private notfor-profit hospitals participate in the public service.
Publicly funded hospital health-care in France is provided by both public hospitals and those private not-for- 2 Public hospitals include military hospitals, which report to the ministry of defence. They constitute 9 out of a total of 942 public hospitals and employ 0.68 % and 0.56 % of the total number of registered and assistant nurses, respectively.
Hospital staffing and local pay 765 profit hospitals 3 which participate in the public service (''service public hospitalier'') [32, 33] . The private hospitals which participate in the public service receive subsidies for equipment. In exchange they have to agree to provide a similar service to that of public hospitals: they have to provide the agreed services at any time of the day and night, they have to either run an emergency ward or be able to redirect patients to a hospital that does [34] . Private hospitals also participate in education and research (in small hospitals through taking medical trainees). Those private hospitals that do not participate in the public service receive funding for only the care they perform: 4 they receive no subsidies for equipment.
Two grades of nurses work in French hospitals: registered and assistant nurses. Registered nurses undergo 38 months' training 5 [3] and are required to qualify and register with Direction Départementale des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales (DDASS) 6 in order to practice. Working alongside them are assistant nurses who have 12 months' training [3] . 7 There is no obligation to stay within the region of training when graduating; the only obligation is not to work as self-employed for 3 years in order to acquire experience in hospitals. Pay for nurses is set by collective agreements which differ for the different sectors (See Subsection 12, page 12).
Some registered nurses have an additional qualification, a diploma, and are called specialised registered nurses. Hospitals have an average of 5 % specialised registered nurses in the total number of registered nurses they employ, and this varies little between hospitals of different status. Nursing staff working in public hospitals generally have the status of civil servants though hospitals can also hire staff under non-statutory contracts. Private hospitals hire staff under either open-ended contracts (Contrats à durée indéterminée) or fixed-term contracts (Contrats à durée déterminée).
Standardised spatial wage differentials
Where areas offer lower levels of amenities or a higher cost of living, compensating wage differential theory argues that wages should be higher. This spatial wage variation can be captured through the estimation of standardised spatial wage differentials (SSWDs) where earnings are standardised for measurable and expected variations in earnings due to differences in the composition of the workforce and the nature of jobs in different areas. In any remaining area-based variation, the SSWD should capture the underlying differences in the cost of living and amenities between areas and reflect what employers are required to offer employees to induce them to work in that particular area. The difference between the SSWD of one group of staff and another can then be taken as a measure of the spatial competitiveness of their pay relative to that comparator group.
We are interested in the spatial variation of pay of two nurse types, assistant nurses and registered nurses, in three sectors; nurses within the public sector, nurses within the private not-for-profit sector and nurses within the private for-profit sector. We are also interested in the non-nurse comparator group; non-nurse employees operating within the non-hospital private sector.
The average pay of nurses working in the different départements 8 in France will be affected by the characteristics and working patterns of the nurses in each département. The proportion working full-time and the gender and age composition of the nursing workforce will differ between hospitals, and as a result average pay levels will differ between hospitals and between départements. Pay in the private non-hospital sector will also vary spatially because the occupational and industrial composition of the workforce will differ spatially. To distinguish the underlying spatial structure of pay we therefore control for differences in the composition of the workforces and working patterns in each département.
SSWDs are estimated from a wage equation and represent the parameters on the area dummies (Eq. 1) where the equation includes controls for the above compositional and working pattern effects. SSWDs are first estimated separately for two groups of staff, registered and assistant nurses, in the hospital public sector. SSWDs are also estimated for a comparator group of employees working in the non-hospital private for-profit sector. In this latter case the comparator group is defined as staff belonging to the 3 Only 20 out of 910 private for-profit hospitals participate in the public service while 482 out of 668 private not-for-profit hospitals participate in the public service. 4 Procedures performed by private hospitals not participating in the public service are, nevertheless, subject to authorisation by the regulatory body (which reports to the Ministry of Health). 5 Registered nurses receive 38 months training in specialised institutions recognised by the Ministry of Health. Entrance to training is open to anyone who has the baccalauréat and is at least 17 years of age before the end of the year in which the exams are held. 6 Regional authorities (préfet) will grant authorisation to practice following the decision of a regional committee. These regional committees were set up by the Direction Départementale des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales (DDASS) which, up to 2010, were the public bodies in charge of organisation of health care at the département level. 7 Assistant nurses receive 12 months' training in institutes that are recognised by the Ministry of Health. Entrance to training is open to anyone who has completed a secondary education and achieved the brevet des collèges (BEPC) and is at least 17 years of age before the end of the year in which the exams are held. same occupational code (Professions et Catégories Socioprofessionnelles) as assistant and registered nurses. SSWDs are estimated as follows:
Equation 1: equations for SSWDs estimation
where lh isk is the log of hourly earnings of individual i who works in the s sector of the economy (hospital public sector or non-hospital private for-profit sector) in area k. The vector x contains all the control variables (age, age-square, gender and year dummies, and for the private for-profit nonhospital sector, industry and occupational dummies), e isk are the individual-specific error terms, l k are the area-specific effects and c sk their associated vector of parameters. The area-specific effects represent the SSWDs and are estimated by including a dummy variable for each area. The value of the SSWD in any département reveals by how much standardised pay differs from pay in the reference département, the reference area.
From the estimation of Eq. 1 we can compute gaps between the hospital public sector and the non-hospital private for-profit sector as a difference between the SSWDs of nurses (assistant nurses or registered nurses) in public hospitals and the SSWDs of a comparator group working in the private non-hospital sector. This gap measure represents the spatial variation in the competitiveness of the public sector nurse pay to their non-nursing private sector comparators and is defined in Eq. 2.
Equation 2: definition of gap between the hospital public sector and the non-hospital private for-profit sector, Gap GLM
where 1 represents the SSWD vector for nurses working in the hospital public sector and 2 is the SSWD vector for the comparator group of employees working outside the hospital sector in firms in the private for-profit sector, while k indexes the area. GLM refers to the general comparable labour market to which the nurses are being compared, and is defined above as staff belonging to the same broad occupational code, working in the private non-hospital sector.
We also wish to investigate the competitiveness of pay within the nursing sector: between the public hospital sector and the private not-for-profit and the private for-profit hospital sectors for both assistant and registered nurses. As above, we estimate separately for two groups of staff: registered and assistant nurses. We compare the competitiveness of pay within départements but can derive a direct estimation of the gap measures within the nursing sector as outlined in Eq. 3.
Equation 3: definition of gaps between the hospital public sector and the two other hospital sectors, Gaps PNP and PP
where lh isk is the log of hourly earnings of individual i who works in the s sector of the economy (where s first represents the public sector hospital and private for-profit hospital sector, then represents the public sector hospital and private not-for-profit hospital sector) in area k. The vector x contains all the control variables (age, age-square, gender, part-time dummy and year dummies), e isk are the individual-specific error terms and l k are the area-specific effects. u s is a set of dummies for all but the hospital public sector, and the associated parameters gap sk represent the log-standardised wage gap between the sector s of the economy and the hospital public sector and thus provides a direct estimation of the gaps. Its associated t-statistics reveal whether the gap for region k is statistically different from 0. c PU is the vector of SSWDs for the hospital public sector which is already estimated in Eq. 1. We name the gap between the public hospital sector and the private notfor-profit sector Gap PNP and the gap between the public hospital sector and the private for-profit sector Gap PP.
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Models and hypotheses
The analysis will explore whether the spatial variations in the competitiveness of nursing pay are associated with variations in the employment of nursing staff in French public sector hospitals. We will consider the impact of the competitiveness of pay on each nurse type, whether the impact differs with the three sectors competing with the public sector hospitals and whether there are any crossover effects on the competitiveness of pay of one nurse type to the other. The underlying hypothesis is that the less competitive the wage is, the higher the constraint on the hospital's ability to hire staff and the greater the shortage of staff will be. Hospital vacancy rates and staff turnover are often employed as measures of hospital staff shortages. However, there are no data on nursing vacancies, or nursing staff turnover in France. Instead, we construct three different measures of nurse employment that should give us an understanding of the role of pay in the delivery of public service. The first two aim to proxy shortage: these are a nurse-to-bed ratio and a nurse-to-episode ratio, where episodes are single episodes of care. Our data span a time of recognised shortages of nursing staff [3] [4] [5] . In 9 We add the superscript suffix AN or RN to each gap measure to signify whether it refers to assistant nurses (AN) or registered nurses (RN) resulting in 6 gap measures in total, Gap GLM AN consequence, we shall assume that there is a relationship between these two measures and staff shortage; higher values of these variables should proxy better staffing and fewer shortages. The third measure is the ratio of registered to assistant nursing staff. While better nurse staffing is not the only factor contributing to care quality [35] , poor quality care has been associated with inadequate nurse-to-patient ratios [36, 37] and nurse-to-bed ratios [38] . A recent example has been documented in England where staffing numbers in a hospital were so low that quality of care deteriorated below minimum standards [39] . Indeed, in some countries there are mandated nurse-to-patient ratios [40, 41] . To our knowledge there is no study using nurse-to-episode ratios. We think that episodes are our best proxy for the number of patients. The nurse-to-episode ratio is expected to capture quality of care as nurse-to-patient ratios have in other studies (Shuldham et al. 2009; Stone et al. 2007 ). As we expect the competitiveness of pay to impact on each type of nursing staff, we also consider the ratio of the two nursing staff types employed within the hospital sector.
Nurse-to-bed and nurse-to-episode own-gap
Hospitals cannot set the pay of their workers: they are bound by the regulation of wages. Workers, when choosing jobs, take into account not only the pay offered by the potential workplace but also the characteristics of the surrounding area in terms of cost of living and amenities. Moreover, workers may have different opportunities to work in different sectors of the economy which might offer different pay. Where the pay in the alternative sector is more attractive, hospitals should find it more difficult to attract workers. Where the pay gap for a group of staff is more competitive, hospitals should experience fewer shortages, therefore they should have better staffing as measured by staff per bed or staff per episode ratios. The estimating equation is:
Equation 4: nurse-to-bed and nurse-to-episode models with own gap NBR ANðRNÞ jk
where NBR ANðRNÞ jk is the nurse-to-bed ratio (either assistant or registered nurses) employed in hospital j in département k.
NER ANðRNÞ jk
is the assistant or registered nurse-to-episode ratio. a is the intercept of the model. GapZ refers to the Gap measure calculated between the public sector hospital and one of its three competing sectors; GLM, PNP and PP, with b 1 being the parameter which measures the competitiveness of the pay of the nursing staff group for whom the equation is estimated. X jk is a vector of activity variables for hospital j in département k including measures of hospital size, capital and occupancy rates as control variables relevant to the dependent variable and e j is the error term.
In general we would expect that the greater the gap measure, the more competitive public hospital nursing staff pay is, the easier it is to recruit and thus, the higher the nurse-to-bed and nurse-to-episode ratios are expected to be. Thus, a positive sign is expected: the more competitive registered (assistant) nurses' pay is, the larger the nurse-tobed and nurse-to-episode ratios.
Different effects might be observed for different groups of staff reflecting different degrees of connectedness between the competing sectors. Assistant nurses have less training, less human capital than registered nurses, and the human capital they have is likely to be more transferable and less specific to nursing. We would therefore expect that the competitiveness of wages relative to the non-hospital sector should have a stronger impact on assistant nurses than on registered nurses. On the other hand, the two alternative private hospital sectors are interested in the same skills as the public hospital sector for each nurse type. Therefore, the competitiveness of public sector pay relative to the two alternative hospital sectors should have a similar impact on the two groups of nursing staff.
Crossover effects
The competitiveness of pay of one group of nurses might also affect the working conditions of other nurses working in the same sector. We therefore build a second model where we introduce the relevant gap of the alternative nurse type as given in Eq. 5.
Equation 5: nurse-to-bed, nurse-to-episode and nurse ratio models with own and alternative staff gaps For instance, where the pay of assistant nurses is uncompetitive any resulting shortages of assistant nurses will likely increase the intensity and arduousness of work of registered nurses and thus reduce the hospital's ability to attract registered nurses. The reverse, less competitive pay for registered nurses, may be thought less likely to impact on assistant nurses as they are less likely to perform tasks usually performed by registered nurses as they should not have many of the skills. 10 However, competitive pay for registered nurses may indicate a future competitive pay for assistant nurses willing to climb the occupational ladder. In consequence, assistant nurses might indeed be sensitive to registered nurses' pay competitiveness.
Nurse-ratio
Hospitals may wish to dampen the effects of shortage of staff by altering the staff mix. Evidence of the substitutability of nursing staff is scarce [10] and mixed. However, where possible, hospitals should employ a larger number of workers relative to other workers where the pay of this former group of staff is more competitive. Therefore, where the pay for one group of staff is more competitive, we would expect hospitals to have a larger share of this group of staff. Staff mix can therefore be understood to some extent as how hospitals react to differences in the competitiveness of pay. We explore this hypothesis using the ratio of registered nurses to total nursing staff (registered nurses plus assistant nurses) with the resulting model given in Eq. 6. Both gaps will enter this model to allow the competitiveness of both nurse types to influence the overall nurse-ratio.
Equation 6: nurse-ratio models
where NR jk is the ratio of registered nurses to total registered and assistant nursing staff employed in hospital j in département k with GapZ ANðRNÞ k
, GapZ
RNðANÞ k and X jk defined as above.
Where the pay for one group of staff is more competitive we expect the ratio of this group of staff to be larger. We therefore expect to have the pay competitiveness of each group of staff to have opposing effects on the ratio of registered nurses: the registered nurses' gap to have a positive effect and the assistant nurses' gap to have a negative effect.
Data
The analysis requires data from nursing and non-nursing occupational groups and also hospital based data. Data on hospitals comes from the ''Statistiques Annuelles des Etablissements de Santé'' (SAE) which is a dataset available from the French Ministry of Health. 11 This data gives information on all health care premises (''Etablissement de santé'') including all public, private not-for-profit and private for-profit hospitals in France with completion of the SAE a legal requirement. 12 Data from the SAE were linked to data from the ''Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales'' (DADS) which is an administrative data set which gives details of the pay and employment of all employees in all firms in France. Each year all companies are required to provide the fiscal and social authorities with the names of all the employees during the past year and to provide information on their sex, age, address, hours worked, position, qualification and the pay they received. The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE, Institut National de la Statistique et des É tudes É conomiques) check and validate the data. Two formats of this data exist, one which is exhaustive and which was used when extracting data for nurses and the other which is a sample of 1 in 12 and which was used in this analysis of the non-nursing comparator group.
Data Public and private sector hospitals also differ in activity. Public hospitals are more likely to have medicine, surgery and obstetric (MSO), psychiatry (PSY) and long-stay (LST) wards than either of the two private hospital types. The proportion of hospitals with MSO, PSY and LST wards is 72, 22 and 85 %, respectively, in the public sector while the shares are 29, 7 and 67 %, respectively, for private not-for-profit hospitals and 54, 14 and 33 %, respectively, for private for-profit hospitals. 13 
Hospital type

Pay
In the following analysis we shall use data on the net wage, which is the wage after deductions of payments for social benefits (pensions, 14 health insurance, unemployment benefits). Deductions differ between sectors, for example public sector workers do not contribute to unemployment insurance [44] while this is deducted from private sector pay. The same applies to pensions. All pensions are deducted from the gross salary: the pension rate for civil servants is different to that in the private sector. Thus, gross pay is not comparable across sectors. We follow Meurs and Edon [31] who used ''net pay'', 15 when they investigated the impact of pay in the private sector on pay in the public sector.
Two main collective agreements set the pay of nursing staff in the private sector. The FEHAP 16 covers 70 % of staff in private not-for-profit hospitals and the FHP 17 covers 90 % of staff in private for-profit hospitals. 18 There are advantages to working in public hospitals. The statutory contracts in public hospitals are lifetime contracts. A P50 represents the 50th percentile, therefore it is the median. P10 and P90 are the corresponding percentiles 13 Hospital data also include number of beds, number of days realised and other technology indicators such as the number of scanners. Full details are available in the Appendix with the full results. 14 Pensions are deducted on gross pay, net pay is therefore net of pension deductions even for complementary pensions. 15 As defined in France, gross pay minus social contributions but without deducting income tax. 16 Federation of not-for-profit hospital and private assistance premises (Fédération des établissements hospitaliers et d'assistance privés à but non lucratif). 17 Private federation of hospitals (Fédération hospitalière privée). 18 All hospitals are covered by a collective agreement.
household with one member having such a contract will have less difficulty obtaining a mortgage compared to a household with the same income without such a contract. Not all individuals working in the public sector have a statutory contract but the prospect of obtaining one in the future might be an incentive to stay in the public service. Average pay as reported in DADS is shown in Table 2 . Net pay is reported and Table 2 shows this differs by hospital type. Assistant and registered nurses in public hospitals earn more on average than their private sector counterparts: net pay of 11.33 and 14.18€ per hour, respectively, compared to net pay of 10.02 and 13.71€ per hour in private not-for-profit hospitals and 9.53 and 13.35€ per hour in private for-profit hospitals.
Geography
Hospitals in France can be assigned to the following geographical areas: communes, départements and régions. There are 36,000 communes but only 22 régions in France. Most communes cover a small geographical area and therefore do not constitute the labour markets in which nurses are recruited. Equally, régions are too large and encompass several labour markets. Travel to work areas (TTWAs) have been mapped for France, 19 however, as with other countries these describe the average travel to work area across all employees and they are not identified for specific occupations. 20 Specific TTWAs for nurses (and their comparators) would have been our preferred geography, however, in the absence of such a mapping the département is chosen. This may be a limitation of the study. However, a similar study for the UK preferred administrative boundaries based on goodness of fit statistics to TTWA [46] . There are 96 départements in metropolitan France. Départements also have the advantage that they have not changed over the years.
Dependent variables
In the absence of a more direct measure of shortages within the nursing sector, we construct three different measures of nurse employment that should give us an understanding of the role of pay in public hospital staffing.
Nurse-to-bed ratio
The number of nurses per bed is computed by dividing the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff by the number of beds available for both complete care 21 and weekly care at hospitals. 22 Formally, this variable is built for registered and assistant nurses as follows: is the nurse-to-bed ratio (either assistant or registered nurses) employed in hospital j in département k with AN (RN) representing the number of assistant or registered nurses, respectively. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the nurse-to-bed ratio for each group of hospitals.
Nurse-to-episode ratio
We sum the number of episodes in both complete care and weekly care at hospitals and this is used to divide the number of staff in each hospital: 19 There are 341 ''zones d'emploi'' in France. 20 The fact that TTWA do not identify occupations is highlighted in the review of the TTWA for the UK as a drawback of this measure [45] . 21 Complete care is major treatments that involve a long admission period. 22 Weekly care are patients who remain in hospital for less than 5 days. 23 In addition to the mentioned episodes we also investigated adding the number of patients who came for night care, ambulatory surgery, day care and at-home care. This did not change the results qualitatively.
¼
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where NER ANðRNÞ jk is the nurse-to-episode ratio (either assistant or registered nurses) employed in hospital j in département k with AN (RN) representing the number of assistant or registered nurses, respectively. Table 3 presents the number of nurses per episode. For each episode there are 0.067 assistant nurses and 0.15 registered nurses. These numbers may seem low but the number of episodes are for a calendar year and the number of nurses are full-time equivalent during that same year. Ten percent of hospitals have as low as 0.017 registered nurses per episode and 0.014 assistant nurses per episode.
Ratio of staff numbers
In order to consider how the relative competitiveness of wages for our two nursing groups may impact on the mix of staff employed within the hospital sector we combine the figures of both assistant nurses and registered nurses as a ratio as follows:
Equation 9: ratio of staff
where NR jk represents the registered nurse ratio for hospital j in département k and RN and AN represent registered and assistant nurses, respectively.
Repeated observations
The data set contains repeated observations on individual hospitals; each hospital is a cluster that has observations for 3 years. Moreover, each observation of the Gap measure is repeated for all hospitals within a département. Therefore, the département is a cluster with many observations but only one value for each gap. Since we are interested in the effect of the Gap on the hospitals, we cluster the standard deviations of the parameters at the département level as this is the area level of the variable of interest. With repeated observations on hospitals, the assumption of homoscedasticity of observations is no longer sustainable. Consequently, in the following regression analysis the variance-covariance matrix is adjusted to take into account repeated observations at the département-cluster level. The modified variance-covariance will give département cluster-robust standard errors [47, 48] .
Results
We first consider the degree of spatial variations in the competitiveness of the pay of nurses in the public sector in France compared to their non-nurse private sector comparators and their nursing comparators within the private for-profit and private not-for-profit sectors. We then consider the impact that this has on measures of nurse employment.
Spatial variations in the degree of competitiveness of nursing pay Table 4 provides evidence that the competitiveness of assistant nurses' and registered nurses' pay varies across the départements of France. The gaps vary spatially as evidenced by the range and standard deviations. For assistant nurses the spatial variation in competitiveness is largest when their pay is compared to assistant nurses in private not-for-profit hospitals (Gap PNP AN ). For registered nurses the spatial variation in competitiveness is largest when their pay is compared to registered nurses working in private for-profit hospitals (Gap PP RN ). Gaps PNP and PP reveal how much more/less pay the public sector awards compared to the two private hospital sectors. For assistant nurses, for any département, the public hospital SSWD is at least 19 % larger than in its private sector counterpart and, on average, the public sector SSWD is around 25 % larger than in either of the two private hospital sectors. For registered nurses, the private not-for-profit hospitals have larger SSWDs in nearly all départements and when this sector does pay less it is by a maximum of 1.24 % which is not statistically significant (significance not shown). On average, the private not-forprofit hospital sector pays more than the public sector by 11.25 %. When compared with private for-profit sectors, the public sector SSWD is on average slightly lower by 2.83 %, but this ranges from the public sector exhibiting an SSWD larger by up to 13.4 %, to the public sector paying less than the private for-profit sector by 15 %. Gaps GLM give the pay gap between the public hospital sector and the non-hospital private for-profit sector. The descriptive statistics of these gaps are more difficult to interpret. A département that has a gap value of 0.1 tells us that in that département, relative to the non-hospital private for-profit sector, hospitals in the public sector give a 10 % premium to their employees compared to a reference département (Val d'Oise). Therefore, this does not tell us how much the public sector pay compares directly with the private, but how much more/less the public sector pay is relative to the private compared to a reference département. In the reference département, the gap is 0. In the most well paid département, the gap reaches 15.6 % difference for assistant nurses (maximum-minimum = [0.0930 -(-0.0629)]). For registered nurses this difference goes to 20.9 % [0.1762 -(-0.033)] indicating that in some départements, hospitals are paying 21 % more to registered nurses compared to the non-hospital private for-profit sector than in the lower paid département.
Nurse-to-bed and nurse-to-episode models with own gap Tables 5 and 6 report the results for the models following from Eq. 4 that consider the impact of the competitiveness of pay on public sector hospital nurse-to-bed and nurse-toepisode measures, respectively. For simplicity we withhold the results for the vector of covariates 24 and only report the key Gap variable. The Tables first show the results for assistant nurses with either the gap measure for the competitiveness of the public sector assistant nurses with those of their private sector non-nurse comparators, their private not-for-profit nursing comparators and finally their private for-profit comparators. The next sections of the Tables repeat the analysis for the registered nurse group. Table 5 shows that where the pay for assistant nurses is more competitive relative to the comparator group in the non-hospital for-profit sector (gap GLM AN ) the assistant nurse-to-bed ratio is larger. This is as expected: where public hospitals are in areas with more competitive pay compared to alternative sectors they should be able to recruit more nurses. An increase of one standard deviation of the assistant nurses' gap increases the assistant nurse-tobed ratio by 0.083 which represents 11.9 % of the standard deviation 25 of the assistant nurse-to-bed ratio (0.083/ 0.698). There is no evidence of any significant effect of the competitiveness of assistant nurses' pay to their counterparts in the private hospital sector. Neither is there evidence of a significant effect of the competitiveness of registered nurses' pay on the registered nurse-to-bed ratio.
The full results for the nurse-to-bed ratios including the vector of covariates controlling for hospital characteristics are reported in an Appendix (Appendix 1, ESM) where we observe that the characteristics of hospitals are mostly significant. The medicine, surgery and obstetric wards are associated with larger assistant and registered nurse-to-bed The SSWD gap comparing the public sector SSWD with the non-hospital private for-profit sector, Gap GLM, is in reference to one département (Val d'Oise, number 95). In consequence the mean value is uninformative. For the other gaps, the estimation process described in Eq. 3 allows the interpretation of the mean as being the average difference in pay between the public hospital and the alternative hospitals GLM is the gap between the public hospital sector and the private for-profit non-hospital sector, PNP is the gap between the public hospital sector and the private not-for-profit hospital sector and PP is the gap between the public hospital sector and the private for-profit sector, AN is the suffix for Assistant Nurses and RN for registered nurses 24 Covariates include the ones described in 5.1 and number of beds, number of days realised and different indicators of equipment; the full list is available in the Appendix. 25 As reported in Table 3 .
Hospital staffing and local pay 773 ratios and long-stay wards with lower assistant and registered nurse-to-bed ratios. Hospitals with psychiatric wards are associated with lower assistant nurse-to-bed ratios and larger registered nurse-to-bed ratios. Table 6 indicates that there is no evidence of a significant effect of the competitiveness of either assistant nurses' or registered nurses' pay on the nurse-to-episode measure with no gap parameter significant in any model. Tables 7 and 8 report the results for the models that consider the impact of the competitiveness of pay on the public sector hospital nurse-to-bed and nurse-to-episode measures where we introduce crossover effects as in Eq. 5. This allows the employment measure of one type of nursing staff to be influenced by both its own competitiveness of pay and also that of the alternative nursing type. Again, the Tables present an extract of the results showing the key Gap variable with full results reported in the Appendix. Table 7 reports the results for the impact on the nurse-tobed ratios. The inclusion of the competitiveness of pay of the alternative group of staff does not bring much information to the model as measured by the R-squared (last row of Table 7 ). However, the parameter for the gap GLM AN in the assistant nurses' model increases from 0.083 to 0.105, which is an increase of 26.5 % and the effect now represents 15 % of the standard deviation of the assistant nurse-to-bed ratio. Table 8 reports the results for the nurseto-episode model whereas in Table 6 none of the parameters for the gap measures are significant. Nurse ratio model Finally, Table 9 presents the results for the nurse ratio model following Eq. 6. The main result is that the pay gaps of type GLM are significant with the expected sign for both the pay competitiveness of assistant and registered nurses.
Crossover effects
Where the pay is more competitive, the proportion of staff of that group is larger. An increase in the competitiveness of registered (assistant) nurses' pay by one standard deviation increases the ratio of registered nurses by around 1 percentage point (0.009 9 100). An increase in the competitiveness of assistant nurses' pay by one standard deviation reduces the registered nurse ratio and is equivalent to an increase in the ratio of assistant nurses of 1.4 percentage points (0.014 9 100).
Sensitivity and robustness check
Sub-samples
As a sensitivity analysis (Appendix 2, ESM), we computed the five same models as above on four smaller sub-samples of hospitals, Local Hospitals (973 observations), Large 27 For Local Hospitals, the assistant nurses' Gap GLM AN parameter in the assistant nurse-to-bed model remains significant and is doubled in magnitude compared to the full sample. The assistant nurses' Gap PP AN parameter is also significant and positive in the assistant nurse-to-bed ratio. In the registered nurses ratio, the Gaps PP are both significant and of the expected signs: negative for the assistant nurses' gap and positive for the registered nurses' gap.
In the sample of Regional Hospitals, the main result of the full sample, the parameter of the gap GLM AN for assistant nurses on the assistant nurse-to-bed ratio is significant but reversed. For Regional Hospitals, where the pay for assistant nurses is more competitive, the assistant nurse-to-bed ratio is lower. This result also holds for Gap PP. The Gap PNP RN for registered nurses is significant in the registered nurse-to-bed and nurse-to-episode model but again is unexpectedly negative. However, these results are obtained for a very small sub-sample of hospitals, only 87 observations.
For Hospitals Specialised in Psychiatry, the Gaps GLM are significant in the registered nurse-to-bed model. The registered nurse Gap GLM RN is positive as expected but the assistant nurses' Gap GLM AN is unexpectedly negative indicating that more competitive pay for assistant nurses works as a deterrent for registered nurses in these hospitals.
The Other Hospital group, which represents the largest sub-sample, shows similar results to the main sample. The effect of the assistant nurses' gap on the assistant nurse-tobed ratio is halved but remains statistically significant.
Specialised nurses
Nurse-to-bed and nurse-to-episode ratios of the form given in Eqs. 7 and 8 are built for specialised nurses (Appendix 3, ESM). However, we do not have a gap measure specifically for specialised nurses and use the ones already constructed for assistant and registered nurses. The two gaps GLM for assistant and registered nurses are significant in the specialised nurse-to-bed model. Where the pay for assistant nurses is more competitive, the specialised nurse-to-bed ratio is larger. The effect is opposite for the registered nurses' gap. This may suggest that assistant nurses are complements to specialised nurses with registered nurses being substitutes. However, this model, while capturing the crossover effects as in Eq. 5, is lacking the ''own'' competitiveness of pay effect through an inability to construct a gap measure specifically for specialised nurses.
Clustering
Gaps are built over département, while we have observations for each hospital within a département (Appendix 4, ESM). As previously discussed in Section 5.5, we clustered our results by département as our main interest lies in the Gap measure. However, we provide (in Appendix 4, ESM) a sensitivity analysis clustered at the hospital level showing that the only difference is the p value for the parameter of the gap GLM RN for registered nurses in the registered nurses ratio. When clustered at the département level the parameter is significant at the 10 % level; when it is clustered at the hospital level, the parameter is significant at the 5 % level.
Discussion
The analysis in this paper first demonstrates that even though pay in France is regulated in the public and private hospital sectors as well as in the private non-hospital sector, there are sizeable spatial variations in its 26 Hospitals not covered by the named categories. This represents the largest category. This is how the SAE data describes hospitals with no further detail available. 27 The remaining miscellaneous sub-category of hospitals gathers very different types of hospitals including military hospitals (30 observations), paediatric hospitals (3 observations), long-stay hospitals (9 observations), joint ventures of hospitals participating in the public service, public hospitals and private not-for-profit hospitals which participate in the hospitals public service (27 observations), alcoholics post-care centres (3 observations) and health-care for prisons (3 observations).
competitiveness. The evidence presented in Section 6.1 suggests the existence of variations in the competitiveness of pay between nurses in the public sector with nurses in the private not-for-profit sector, nurses within the private for-profit sector and the non-hospital private sector. There is also evidence that these patterns differ according to nurse type. The analysis then explores the implications of this and the consequences these spatial variations have on the employment of nurses in French public hospitals. Our underlying hypothesis is that the less (more) competitive the wage is, the higher (lower) the constraint on the hospital& s ability to hire staff and the higher (lower) the shortage of staff will be. We also hypothesised that the effect may differ according to nurse type as a result of differing degrees of connectedness between the competing sectors. Although assistant nurses hold less human capital than registered nurses, it is likely to be more general. Assistant nurses should therefore be able to transfer their skills more easily to another sector of the economy. Moreover, for assistant nurses it might be easier to move back and forth between the hospital and non-hospital sectors. Accordingly, assistant nurses' employment in public hospitals would be expected to be more sensitive to pay in other jobs than is that of registered nurses. This is confirmed by our results that indicate that employment of assistant nurses in terms of their nurse-to-bed or nurse-toepisode measures is shown to be sensitive to the pay of workers with a similar job within the non-hospital private for-profit sector.
We find that the employment of registered nurses is not sensitive to the competitiveness of pay when compared to jobs outside nursing. Registered nurses have much higher levels of human capital and a large part of this will be specific to the hospital sector. The higher the level of specific human capital, the lower will be the return to prior training of registered nurses if they work outside the hospital sector [49, 50] . This is because specific human capital is less transferable and the skills they hold when working in a health care setting would be partially lost if they moved to a non-hospital sector. For registered nurses the effective choices are likely between working in public hospitals or working in private hospitals. However, we do not find any evidence that the competitiveness of pay for registered nurses has a significant impact on their employment as measured by nurse-to-bed or nurse-to-episode measures. Indeed we find no evidence that registered nurses within the public sector are influenced by pay competitiveness for either the non-nursing sector nor their closer comparators within the private for-profit or private not-for-profit nursing sectors.
We further hypothesised that there could be some crossover effects where the competitiveness of pay for one type of staff may impact on the other through its impact on the resulting characteristics of the workplace. We might expect this impact to depend on the type of staff. For registered nurses we would argue that if hospitals have difficulties in hiring assistant nurses because of their noncompetitive pay, then this may imply higher workloads for registered nurses. This might deter registered nurses from working in that hospital. For assistant nurses, where pay for registered nurses is uncompetitive then it might work as a deterrent as it is a signal to assistant nurses of additional expectations on their role or indeed an indication of future uncompetitive pay if they continue on to registered nurse employment. However, our analysis does not provide any evidence that there is any effect of the pay of the alternative nurse group. In consequence, we conclude that the pay competitiveness of an alternative nursing group does not capture hidden characteristics of the workplace such as potential pay prospects or more strenuous work demands.
Our final model considers whether hospitals are likely to substitute one group of staff for another according to the competitiveness of the pay. Where the pay for assistant nurses is more (less) competitive, we might expect hospitals to tend to have a larger (smaller) proportion of assistant nurses relative to registered nurses. We find that the competitiveness of pay for both registered and assistant nurses in public sector hospitals with their comparators within the non-hospital sector does influence the relative numbers of nurses as expected. These results provide some evidence that hospitals have a larger share of competitively paid staff. This suggests that hospitals adapt their workforce to the labour market, employing staff which are supposedly in greater supply.
Generally, it should be noted that the effects of the pay gaps are small, a change of one standard deviation in the pay gap, where significant, changes 15 % of the standard deviation of the assistant nurses-to-bed ratio and 10 % of the standard deviation of the nurse-ratio which, in the latter, equates to around 1 % of the proportion of staff. This is not surprising given that pay is regulated in all sectors in France. However, these results provide empirical support for an important general point. Where there is generalised pay regulation, pay cannot adjust to clear the labour market and, as a result, labour supply will be more sensitive to other, non-pay job features. In consequence, the level of employment should be less affected by the pay gaps. The theory of compensating differentials makes clear that it is the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of jobs that tend to equality, and if pay is regulated, adjustment toward equilibrium will take place through changes in other aspects of jobs. Other, non-pay characteristics of the jobs nurses do in public and private hospitals or in other jobs outside the hospital sector are likely to become more important in balancing supply and demand and therefore in explaining the employment of nursing staff in public hospitals in France. Because pay is regulated in all sectors in France we would expect the employment of nursing labour in public hospitals to be less sensitive to pay in France than it is in England where private sector pay is unregulated. This article is the starting point for further research on these non-pay characteristics that adjust the labour market.
Other discussion points
The Gap measures are built from spatial wage differentials where there is the assumption that age proxies tenure. We do not have any information as to whether this is accurate or not for the hospital sector. It is likely, though, that age only partially controls for tenure and so part of the differences in wages between sectors we observe may be a consequence of tenure differences. One sector may have staff which have longer tenure and thus higher wages, while another may have staff with lower tenure but not captured by age. This would result in differences in wages which are not capturing the local living environment but tenure differences.
Finally, our paper is framed as if the demand for staff from hospitals does not play any role. We argue that in a time of shortage, where employers can recruit staff, they will do so if needed. This is of course a strong assumption. Other studies are necessary in order to have a better understanding of the role of the competitiveness of pay in recruitment and retention. First, a study of vacant posts could be performed. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no such data exists or is readily available. Alternatively it should be possible to extract a measure of retention through the number of people who left within a year for each hospital. However, this will be a combination of individuals leaving for personal reasons and individuals for which a contract is not renewed. And while we can argue that in a time of shortage hospitals are less likely to fire someone, even if his/her productivity is low, we then return to our earlier assumption.
Conclusions
The research reported above has shown that even in an economy in which wages in both the public and private sectors are regulated to be the same across many different geographic labour markets there are substantial local variations in the competitiveness of nurses' pay. It has been shown that these variations in competitiveness matter; they give rise to some small but significant local variations in the employment of nursing staff in public hospitals.
In France private hospitals employ nurses and supply a much larger share of hospital services than they do, for example, in the UK. Thus, the analysis is able to extend previous analysis undertaken within the English NHS health care system, where the spatial pay competitiveness of public sector nurses can only be compared with their non-hospital private sector comparator group. However, we find it is only the wage competition of non-hospital private for-profit firms that affects the employment of assistant nurses in public hospitals in France: any wage competition from private hospitals has no effect. The analysis shows that the less competitive assistant nurses' pay is in public hospitals compared to that in the non-hospital private sector, the lower is the employment of assistant nurses in public hospitals. Assistant nurses' employment is sensitive to pay in jobs of comparable skill level in the non-hospital private sector.
A general conclusion emerges considering the low impact of the parameters. In economies such as France, in which wages in general are mandated to be the same across different local labour markets and in which the scope for local wage adjustment is therefore restricted, there can still be spatial variations in the competitiveness of the wages of different occupational groups. However, as other authors have noted [6, 7, 9] , these are unlikely to be sufficient to clear the labour market. In this case other non-wage aspects of employment, working conditions, will also be important adjustment mechanisms.
